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The Founder's Notes

Founder index · Pop Mart · 2010–present

Wang Ning

The lesson that travels

The most valuable thing a retailer can learn from its own till is which product the customer is actually buying — and Wang Ning's whole career is the decision to believe the till over the business plan.

Wang Ning was born in 1987 in Henan province, studied advertising at a college attached to Zhengzhou University, ran a small shop while he was a student, and spent a few months at Sina before deciding he would rather be a founder than an employee. In November 2010, at 23, he opened the first Pop Mart in a Beijing mall. The model was Log-On, the Hong Kong variety store: toys, cosmetics, stationery, gadgets, arranged for browsing. It was a shop with taste and no particular idea, and for four years it nearly failed. Investors passed. Wang later said he was turned down by dozens of them before an angel cheque kept the lights on.

What saved the company was not a vision but a spreadsheet. By 2015 the store data showed that one shelf — Sonny Angel, a Japanese blind-box figure — was producing around a third of sales in some locations while everything else idled. Wang asked his Weibo followers what else they collected, got the same answer over and over, and flew to Hong Kong to sign Kenny Wong's Molly. Within a year he had cut the rest of the assortment, and within four he had listed the company in Hong Kong at a valuation above HK$100 billion. He was 33. He and his wife, Yang Tao, still own close to half of it.

The contested part of his record is the mechanism he built. Blind boxes are, structurally, a lottery for children and young adults, and Chinese regulators have already said so — restricting sales to under-eights and requiring odds to be printed. Wang describes Pop Mart as a platform for artists and a company that sells joy, and both are true; it is also a company whose revenue rose and fell with Molly, then rose and fell with Labubu, and whose share price has twice lost most of its value when a character cooled. He has been candid about that in results calls, which I respect. He has been less candid about the artist contracts, which are the whole business and which nobody outside the company has seen.

§01The hard calls

  1. 2010

    Open a variety store in Beijing modelled on Hong Kong's Log-On, with no product of his own.

    Four years of near-failure and a dozen investor rejections. But the store's till data was what eventually revealed the blind box, which a founder with a fixed idea would never have seen.

  2. 2016

    Cut the assortment to designer toys, sign exclusive rights to Kenny Wong's Molly, and launch the first Molly blind-box series.

    The first sets sold out in seconds. Molly earned over RMB 2 billion in 2024 alone, and the decision turned a shop into a company that licenses artists and sells the reveal.

  3. 2019

    Sign Kasing Lung's The Monsters, an unproven Dutch-Hong Kong picture-book series, as one line among many.

    Nothing for four years. Then Labubu became the most valuable toy character of the 2020s, RMB 3 billion of revenue in 2024 and more than that in the first half of 2025 alone.

  4. 2020

    List in Hong Kong at the height of Molly's momentum and use the proceeds for overseas stores rather than acquisitions.

    The shares fell 80% within two years as growth stalled — and the overseas stores opened during the slump became 39% of revenue by 2024 and the engine of the Labubu craze.

  5. 2023

    Open Pop Land, a themed park in Beijing, and begin building animation, games and a jewellery brand around the characters.

    Small so far, and unproven. The move of a company that wants to be Disney, made before it has a character that has lasted a decade.

One of these is set up as a tutorial — you make the call before you find out what Wang did.

Face the decision